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The title of this paper, ‘It’s Like Jumping off a Cliff without a Parachute’ comes 
from a member of a psychodynamic therapy group for women with eating 
problems.  It describes her struggle to both articulate her thoughts and 
feelings, as well as her lack of familiarity with having a receptive audience for 
these words. The group was part of a research project in which l acted as 
both a feminist psychodynamic therapist and a feminist Foucaultian discourse 
analyst in order to reflexively critique my clinical work as well as feminist 
psychoanalytic theory.  My aim was to find a way to think about the ‘psycho-
social’ nature of women’s relationships with their bodies without sliding into 
either a purely intra-psychic perspective which locates pathologies within the 
individual, or adopting a resolutely ‘political’ stance which focuses on how 
eating disorders are socially constructed and produced.  As a feminist and a 
psychodynamic psychotherapist, this was not an easy task and as such, the 
phrase, ‘It’s Like Jumping off a Cliff without a Parachute’ captures some of the 
dilemmas I experienced (and still do).  My intention today is to briefly 
demonstrate why taking a discursive and reflexive stance towards clinical 
practice can be helpful.   
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 Discourse has been described by Hare-Mustin as ‘a system of 
statements, practices, and institutional structures that share common values’ 
(1994:19). Discourse analysis is an integral part of the post-modern ‘turn to 
language’ as constructive rather than revealing.  It is a way of approaching 
interactions, and texts as performing a function rather than revealing content.  
Frosh notes that discourse analysts reject the idea that the self is ‘organised, 
stable... that selfhood comprises a core element of each individual’s 
personality and subjective existence’ (1991:2).  Instead, ‘self’ is regarded as 
something that is constructed and then maintained through ongoing social 
practices.  As such, discourse analysis challenges the notion that personality 
is a thing rather than a concept (Burr 1995). Foucaultian discourse analysts 
are interested in how subjects are discursively positioned within wider social 
discourses; that is, not just how language constructs notions of selves, but 
also how the very notion of a ‘self’ has come to be constructed.  
 Nikolas Rose (1990) has written extensively on the discursive nature of 
psychology and psychotherapy as technologies of subjectivity. For instance, 
he described psychoanalysis, with its practices of confession and self-
examination, as having constructed notions of the ‘therapeutic’ self as a 
matter of fulfilment and identity. As such, mundane experiences become 
psychologically meaningful ‘life events’ and interactions become potentially 
meaningful ‘relationships’ of varying degrees.  This has clear implications for 
clinical practice and clinical research in that we can no longer regard these 
disciplines as ‘discovering’ aspects of subjectivity, but instead as 
‘constructing’ these.  This highlights the need for the theoretician and also the 
clinician, to take a reflexive stance with regard to their work.   
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 With respect to my clinical research project, I had spent many years 
attempting to develop a therapeutic model for working with women who have 
eating disorders.  On the one hand, feminist thinking provided many ways to 
understand eating ‘disorders’ as socially constructed and socially produced.  
On the other hand, as a psychotherapist, the client group I was working with 
didn’t find a focus on the ‘social’ very helpful in enabling them to change.  
They felt caught up in an internal struggle and wanted my help in enabling 
them to change.  Feminist object relations theory offered some means to 
facilitate this process by bridging the psycho-social ‘gap’; for instance, Bloom 
and Kogel (1994) argue that the unconscious consolidation of the body as 
central to women’s subjectivity helps in understanding why the body is so 
central to contemporary western femininity. During the process of gender 
identity formation, ‘a little girl’s mandate to appear (rather than to act or be) 
and to focus on her appearance, is confirmed as intrinsic to her being and 
equal to being an adequate female’ (p.49).  The result of this is that, ‘to some 
degree, for all women, the critical work of separation, differentiation, and 
integrating sexuality are displaced on to a struggle to manage one’s appetite 
for food and to transform one’s body’ (1994b:53).   
 While I think this idea provides a very useful way of exploring the 
gendered interface between the psyche and the social, there is clearly a 
commitment to an intra-psychic perspective here, albeit one which locates this 
within contemporary western culture.  What I found helpful about taking a 
reflexive, Foucaultian approach to thinking about clinical work, was the way in 
it enabled me to reflect much more critically not just about theory (for 
instance, which women are we talking about here?) but also my application of 
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this as part of a  discursive process.  In order to do this, I audio-taped the 
short term eating disorders group I ran in my local NHS, as well as the clinical 
supervision I participated in with a feminist therapist. I ran the psychotherapy 
group as I usually would, and for the most part, I did not attempt to 
discursively analyse the group material until after it had finished.  In contrast, I 
did engage my feminist supervisor to some extent, in a reflexive discussion 
about the discursive nature of our task.  One of the reasons my discourse 
analysis was retrospective, was that as a PhD student, I was only slowly 
developing my thinking during the course of my research.  However, another 
major reason links back to the title of my talk, ‘It’s Like Jumping off a Cliff 
without a Parachute’.  While this describes the struggles the group members 
were going through, it is also captures the enormous challenge I experienced 
in adopting a way of thinking which was so antithetical to that which I was 
used to.  Instead of thinking about the words of patients as reflecting their 
inner state, or my interventions as seeking to uncover unconscious 
processes, I had to shift into a completely different epistemological 
framework.  For example, inevitably there was considerable talk within the 
group about eating behaviour.  As a psychodynamic therapist, my focus was 
to see this as symbolic and to make links between the food, the behaviour, 
body size and shape and unconscious processes – to use Kvale’s (date) 
analogy, I was the modernist ‘miner’, excavating the depths for rich nuggets.  
However, to return to Rose’s ideas, this was an example of all of us 
discursively participating in ‘making meaning’ and ‘making it meaningful’.   
 However, quite clearly, psychoanalysis and discourse analysis are 
projects with differing aims. From a therapeutic perspective, it is crucial to 
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enable patients to develop a ‘sense of selves’, through explicating the 
constitution of subjectivities
 
or ‘the point of contact between identity and 
society’ as Parker describes it (1992:117). Further, it is essential for the 
therapist to facilitate understanding and management of the myriad emotions 
that result from being positioned through particular discourses about selves, 
gender and bodies.  In the end, the aim is to help bring about change and 
control.  In the case of eating problems, I think there is potential for 
strategically combining aspects of feminist object relations theory with way in 
Foucault’s ideas about social positioning, to understand how women 
participate - without apparent coercion - in the construction and maintenance 
of femininity, through private and public observation (Bartky 1988; see also 
Smith 1988 and Bordo 1988). Foucault regarded power as deriving from the 
ways in which discourses come to be equated with truth, and as such, act ‘on’ 
individuals. So, it is not simply that we pick and choose particular social roles.  
Instead, the process of developing subjectivity functions to both provide 
‘selves’ while constraining what is possible; that is, of subjectification.  With 
respect to gendered subjectivity, feminist theorists like Bartky make use of 
Foucault’s (1978) notion of ‘panopticons’, to describe how the feminine body 
is a product of specific cultural and disciplinary practices.   
 Amongst other things, this involves things such as size and shape 
control, and control of movement and posture, as well as providing an 
‘ornamental surface’ on which much can be proscribed (Bartky 1988:64). 
Bartky describes women’s participation in these coercive practices in the 
following way: ‘[i]n contemporary patriarchal culture, a panoptical male 
connoisseur resides within the consciousness of most women: they stand 
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perpetually before his gaze and under his judgement’ (1988:72). Crucially, 
‘the insidiousness of modern discipline is that it provides the means for a 
sense of accomplishment, of being in control, of identity — after all, the 
experience of subjectivity is dependent on not just what one knows, but 
‘knowing what to do’ (Ibid p.77).   
 While I think this latter point really helps to bridge that ‘psycho-
social’ divide, as a clinician I find myself returning to aspects of psychoanalytic 
theory to understand individual differences.  For instance, despite the 
gendered tensions of contemporary western femininity, not every woman 
develops an eating disorder.  Moreover, while we could argue that anorexic or 
bulimic ‘behaviour’ are fairly clear examples of ‘knowing how to do’ femininity 
in extreme ways, this is not so clear for women who eat compulsively and who 
know ‘what to do’ but don’t.  Yes, this could be an example of refusal to 
conform but the experience is not usually one of ‘liberation’ but of despair.  
Here, I think aspects of psychoanalytic theory are more apt than Foucault in 
not just explaining the tenacity of a defence mechanism but also in bringing 
about change. 
 
